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Recent studies have shown what indispensable role mobile phones play as means of 
mobilization in contentious politics around the world. Nevertheless, there has been no 
clear elaboration of how mobile phone uses translate into mobilization in contentious 
politics. To fill this gap, the current study employs Passy’s (2003) framework of the 
threefold function of social ties as channels of mobilization to examine how mobile 
communication, embedding the dynamics of social ties, influences protest mobiliza-
tion. It investigates two cases in rural and urban China in which Chinese people 
employed their mobile phones to mobilize participants for protests, and conducts 24 
in-depth interviews with participants in these protests. Findings suggest that using 
mobile phones for mobilization registers the relational dynamics of social ties, which 
shapes participants’ perceptions of given protest issues, ensures the safety of protest 
recruitment and mobilization in a repressive context, and generates pressure on par-
ticipation, all of which contributes to the mechanism of mobilization. This study con-
cludes with the concept of ‘relational mobilization’, which addresses the embedment 
and relevance of social ties in the process of mobile-phone-mediated mobilization 
and its implication for Asian countries.
Keywords
mobile phone – social ties – relational mobilization – China – guanxi – contentious 
politics
* The author greatly appreciates the constructive comments and detailed feedback from the 
two anonymous reviewers and Florian Schneider’s assistance in improving the manuscript.
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1 Introduction
The swift proliferation of the mobile phone over the past decade has dramati-
cally changed communication practices across the world and facilitated orga-
nization and cooperation in ways that earlier mass media have never been 
able to achieve (e.g. Castells et al. 2007; Katz & Aakhus 2002; Ling 2004, 2008; 
Rainie & Wellman 2012). The technological features of instantaneousness, 
user-friendliness, and mobility, just to mention a few, that mobile communi-
cation characterizes, have provided unprecedented opportunities for recruit-
ing and mobilizing protests and contentions in both liberal democracies and 
authoritarian regimes (e.g. Allagui & Kuebler 2011; Hermanns 2008; Howard 
& Hussain 2011; Rafael 2003; Suárez 2006). Although the relevance of mobile 
phones as key means of mobilization is well documented in the literature, to 
date there has been no clear elaboration of how mobile phone uses contribute 
to the mechanism of mobilization in contentious politics. Especially the ques-
tion of why people follow mobilization messages from their mobile phones 
and engage in protests and contentions remains largely unanswered. To fill 
this gap, the present study integrates the literature of social ties and mobiliza-
tion to scrutinize mobile phone uses and mobile-phone-mediated social ties in 
the process of recruitment and mobilization of contentious politics. By taking 
as its examples two cases in China in which people employed their mobile 
phones as key means for protest mobilization, and by conducting 24 in-depth 
interviews with participants in these protests, this study first aims to specify 
the  dimensions of mobile communication that operate in the recruitment and 
 mobilization of contentious politics. Second, by interrogating the impact of 
digitally-mediated social ties (i.e. mobile-phone-mediated social ties) on pro-
test mobilization, this study contributes to a comprehensive understanding 
of the role that social ties play in collective action mobilization. Third, taking 
mobile phone uses for mobilization in China as the case also helps advance 
our understanding of the emancipatory potential of digital technologies and 
its actualization particularly in contentious politics.
China has had the world’s largest number of mobile phone subscribers since 
2001, surpassing 1.18 billion by the end of July 2013. According to the Ministry of 
Industry and Information Technology (MIIT), this number implies that over 
85 percent of the 1.3 billion Chinese people own a mobile phone today 
(MIIT 2013). Meanwhile, Chinese people devote a remarkable amount of time 
to mobile phone practices in everyday life (cnBeta 2009). The increasing ubiq-
uity and widespread use of mobile phones in China do not just shape the way 
in which people cope with everyday communication activities (e.g. Chu et al. 
2012), but also nourish changes in the way in which people initiate, organize, 
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and coordinate popular protests and collective resistances (e.g. Liu 2013a, 
2013b; Weber 2011). Just as we have already seen in other parts of the world, the 
mobile phone has increasingly been adopted by Chinese people as a pivotal 
means to mobilize a wide range of contentious activities, including mass 
strikes and protests in China (Barboza & Bradsher 2010; Liu 2013b; Xie & Zhao 
2007). As an emerging yet rarely touched upon topic in both communication 
studies and China studies, mobile-phone-mediated protests in China offer 
cases worthy of closer examination for illustrating and understanding the role 
mobile phones play in mobilizing contentious politics.
In the following pages, I first review current scholarship on mobile phones 
and protest mobilizations. Second, given the literature on the relationship 
between social ties and mobilization in social movement studies,1 in particular 
Passy’s (2003) framework of the threefold function of social ties as channels of 
mobilization, I propose to investigate how mobile communication embeds 
and embodies the dynamics of social ties and further influences the process of 
recruitment and mobilization. Third, I specify case selection, data collection, 
and analysis methods. Fourth, I explore the role of mobile phones in the pro-
cess of protest mobilization in sample cases by specifically looking at how 
mobile communication registers the dynamics of social ties as facilitators of 
recruitment and participation in protests. This study concludes with a discus-
sion of the contribution that mobile phones have made to the mechanism of 
mobilization and the implication for Asian countries.
2 Prior Studies on Mobile Phones and Mobilization
The proposition that mobile phones serve as means of mobilization has drawn 
considerable interest from the academic community as an increasing number 
1 Conceptually, the terms ‘contentious politics’ and ‘social movement’ are different from each 
other (e.g. Tilly & Tarrow 2006: 8; Tarrow 2011: 6-7). This study follows McAdam, Tarrow, and 
Tilly’s definition of ‘contentious politics’ as ‘collective political struggle’ (McAdam et al. 2001: 
5), which involves contention, collective action, and politics (see also Tilly & Tarrow 2006: 4). 
According to Tarrow (2011), ‘contentious politics’ can turn into ‘social movement’ and vice 
versa. As he argues, ‘contentious politics is triggered when changing political opportunities 
and constraints create incentive to take action for actors who lack resources on their 
own . . . When backed by well-structured social networks and galvanized by culturally reso-
nant, action-oriented symbols, contentious politics leads to sustained interaction with oppo-
nents – to social movements’ (ibid.: 6). In this sense, this study aims to figure out how people 
transform their social ties and network resources, which can become part of the dynamics of 
social movement, into collective political action with the aid of mobile communication.
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of contentious activities witnessed the appropriation of mobile phones for 
recruitment and mobilization (e.g. Ibahrine 2008; Rafael 2003; Rheingold 
2008). As early as in 2002, Rheingold discussed the emergence of ‘smart mobs’ 
in virtue of the proliferation of mobile communication technologies that dra-
matically amplify people’s organizational capability for political activism. In 
the following decade, the pervasive adoption of the mobile phone as a crucial 
means of recruitment and mobilization for protests around the globe has 
established this device as an indispensable resource in collective activism and 
contentious politics. Although studies have recognized the importance of 
mobile phones as means of mobilization in contentious politics (Castells et al. 
2007: 185-213; Howard 2010; Hermanns, 2008; Ibahrine 2008; Qiu 2008; Suárez 
2006), the contribution of mobile phone uses to the mechanism of mobiliza-
tion is still less well understood.
More specifically, most studies have addressed the technological affor-
dances, or actionable properties (Gibson 1979), of mobile phones – such as 
widespread accessibility, decentralized diffusion of information, high message 
credibility, and asynchronous communication – for mobilization (e.g. Castells 
et al. 2007: 188; Hermanns 2008; Rafael 2003; Rheingold 2008; Suárez 2006). 
Nevertheless, there is not necessarily any causal explanation between these 
affordances and the mechanism of mobilization. In other words, the question 
that remains largely unanswered is how these affordances generate different 
kinds of mobilization mechanisms. A few studies indicate the relevance of con-
text and inter-media dynamics (Qiu 2008; Rafael 2003: 415) beyond mobile 
communication for protest mobilization. Here, the mobile phone has been 
regarded as more or less an instrumental tool (Qiu 2008: 51) that largely 
relies on external forces for legitimating mobilization messages. However, as 
studies persuasively argue, apart from instrumental functions, mobile commu-
nication engenders mediated ritual interaction and strengthens social cohe-
sion within the family and the peer group (e.g. Ling & Yttri 2002; Ling 2008). 
What, then, is the contribution of mobile communication to the mechanism 
of mobilization beyond its instrumental functions? In short, understanding 
the specific dimensions of mobile communication that contribute to recruit-
ment and mobilization would be an important step towards ascertaining the 
theoretical mechanism underlying the effect of mobile communication on 
mobilization.
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3 Social Ties and Mobilization: From Face-to-Face to Mobile-Phone-
Mediated Mobilization
To better understand the role of mobile phones as means of mobilization, this 
study draws lessons from social movement scholars that particularly addressed 
the relevance of social ties as facilitators of mobilization in contentious poli-
tics. Social movement scholars have long recognized that social ties often drive 
people to engage in collective actions (Diani & McAdam 2003; Kim & Bearman 
1997; Kitts 2000; McAdam 1982, 1988; McAdam & Paulsen 1993). According to 
these scholars, people join social movements or engage in contentious politics 
because they are asked by someone with whom they have a social tie and, 
given such kind of social tie, from whom they receive social support on a per-
sonal level.
Simply identifying that social ties encourage participation and mobiliza-
tion, however, is not sufficient to understand the functions of social ties in 
recruitment and mobilization (Gould 2003: 237; McAdam 2003: 287). Instead, 
the key questions that should be asked are why and how social ties matter 
in the process of recruitment and mobilization (Passy 2003). To answer this 
question, studies elucidate the contributions of social ties to the mechanism of 
mobilization from different angles, such as tie strength (Gould 2003; McAdam 
& Paulsen 1993), density and frequency (Marwell et al. 1988), and salience and 
centrality (Fernandez & McAdam 1989).2 Among the many studies, Passy’s 
(2003) work on the threefold function of social ties as channels of mobilization 
provides a valuable framework to understand the role of social ties in 
mobilization.
Beyond simply seeing social ties as ‘instrumental ties enabling or constrain-
ing participation’, Passy argues that they ‘shape both stable aspects such as val-
ues and identities and more volatile aspects such as perceptions and 
preferences’ (ibid.: 23). To be sure, Passy categorizes the role of social ties in the 
process of mobilization by differentiating between three functions: the social-
ization function, through which social ties enable individuals to establish their 
 
2 Social ties refer to the relationships between the actors in a society. The tie strength, or 
strength of a social tie, is ‘a (probably linear) combination of the amount of time, the emo-
tional intensity, the intimacy (mutual confiding), and the reciprocal services which charac-
terize each tie’ (Granovetter 1973: 1361). The density and frequency of social ties are roughly 
defined by the degree of one-to-one (or ‘dyadic’) connections in a population. The term ‘cen-
trality’ describes the relative importance of an actor in a social network, and can be mea-
sured in different ways, e.g. by degree, betweenness, closeness, and eigenvector. For further 
discussions of these concepts, see for instance Wasserman & Faust (1994).
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interpretive frames, construct their identities, and consolidate political con-
sciousness towards a given protest issue; the structural-connection function, 
through which social ties attach potential participants to mobilization oppor-
tunities, encouraging them to convert their political consciousness into action; 
and the decision-shaping function, through which social ties exert significant 
influence on the individual preferences or perceptions that form the very end 
of the process of individual decisions to participate (ibid). By doing so, Passy 
demonstrates the relevance of social ties not only as ‘an environment that 
facilitates recruitment to social movements’, but most importantly as ‘enve-
lopes of meanings’ (ibid.: 42-43) that provide individuals with specific mean-
ing structures (through the socialization and decision-shaping functions) 
which affect their participation. As a key part of mobilization, Passy addresses 
in her study the process of social interactions taking place among individuals 
with social ties, as this process facilitates both the production of meanings that 
are integrated into the self, and the communication of perceptions and prefer-
ences that later engages others in collective action (ibid.: 26). In short, beyond 
the instrumental function, social ties embody ‘islands of meanings which 
define and redefine individual identities through their interactions with other 
actors or groups, but also by shaping more volatile perceptions or preferences’ 
through ‘the cultural dimension of social interaction’ (ibid.: 27). As such, 
Passy’s framework calls for a comprehensive and nuanced account of the role 
of social ties in the process of mobilization.
As a valuable framework for understanding social ties as facilitators of 
mobilization, Passy’s work has yet to be employed to investigate the contribu-
tion from social ties mediated by and embedded in new communication tech-
nologies to collective actions in current ‘networked’ society (Rainie & Wellman 
2012). Given her framework of a threefold function of social ties in mobiliza-
tion, this study aims to figure out how mobile-phone-mediated social ties 
work, and how they contribute to protest mobilization. Additionally, Passy’s 
elaborations are largely based on social ties within social movement organiza-
tions (SMOs) in stable liberal and democratic contexts (2003: 28). In such 
settings, SMOs enjoy relative autonomy from the state and contribute signifi-
cantly to the organization of collective action. In contrast to this, in repressive 
regimes like China, social organizations have been situated in a different envi-
ronment and remain under the stern control of the authorities (e.g. Teets 2013). 
Against this backdrop, Passy predicates that social ties play a greater role in 
mobilization for collective actions, as they enable covert recruitment of par-
ticipants and supporters in a precarious context (2003: 27). Nevertheless, she 
does not include any empirical evidence to support or explain this argument. 
Unpacking the functions of mobile-phone-mediated social ties in protest 
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mobilization in the absence of SMOs thus also yields a comprehensive under-
standing of the role that social ties play in collective action mobilization.
Before moving on to the next section, it is necessary here to specify the word 
guanxi (关系), a key concept for the intricate social ties in Chinese culture. 
Guanxi connotes pervasive social ties among parties that make up a social net-
work in Chinese society (Gold et al. 2002; Park & Luo 2001). Beyond its literal 
translations as ‘relation’ or ‘personal connections’, guanxi implies intangible 
emotional attachments (e.g. trust and reliability) and ethical obligations estab-
lished by reciprocity between two or more individuals (Christensen & Levinson 
2003: 573; Gold et al. 2002: 4). Pervading every aspect of Chinese society, guanxi 
have also penetrated mobile interactions (Chu et al. 2012; Chu & Yang 2006; 
Wallis 2013). In a previous study (Liu 2013b: 151-177), I have therefore proposes 
the concept of a ‘guanxi-embedded mobile social network’, in which guanxi 
have been incorporated into both mobile communication and interpersonal 
networks in the wake of the increasing popularity of mobile devices and the 
huge rise of phone use in maintaining social ties and relations in Chinese soci-
ety. To maintain consistency within the discussion, the following sections use 
the term ‘social tie’ to mean guanxi unless otherwise specified.
4 Methods
This study employs a descriptive multiple case study design (Tobin 2010) to get 
a nuanced picture of mobile phone uses in protest mobilization. This design 
also makes it possible to compare differences within and between cases, and 
generalize what is common across the cases (Yin 2009: 18). This study picks up 
the following two cases: an anti-ParaXylene (‘anti-PX’ for short) protest in 
southeast China’s Xiamen city in 2007 and a mass protest in southwest China’s 
Weng’an County in 2008.
4.1 The Anti-PX Protest in Xiamen
As one of the largest middle-class protests in recent years, the anti-PX protest 
in Xiamen has become an example of ‘the power of text messaging’ (Xie & 
Zhao 2007), which facilitated protests and remade the public agenda. Without 
informing residents, local government initiated construction of a petrochemi-
cal factory that was to produce PX, which residents later perceived as a threat 
to their health and well-being. To keep residents from arguing against this proj-
ect, the government prevented the distribution of reports that questioned 
the project, censored related words on the Internet, shut down online forums 
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that tried to voice opposition against the government, and asserted that the 
negative information about the PX project was merely ‘rumour’.3 Nevertheless, 
the argument against the PX project was diffused and proliferated largely via 
mobile messages, despite government efforts to snuff out the discussion; 
through such messages, residents urged each other to show their dissatisfac-
tion towards the government decision by joining a street protest. One of the 
most renowned texts that ‘millions of Xiamen residents forwarded frenziedly 
via their mobile phones’ over the course of three days read (Lan & Zhang 2007; 
author’s translation):
For the sake of our future generations, take action! Participate among 
10,000 people, June 1st at 8 a.m., opposite the municipal government 
building! Hands tied with yellow ribbons [as a symbol for environmental 
protection]! Pass this message on to all your Xiamen friends!
The proliferation of mobile texts calling for protests resulted in two-day pro-
tests with over 20,000 participants. The protests had forced local government 
to halt the construction of the PX project immediately and relocate it six 
months later.
4.2 The Weng’an Mass Incident
Different from the environmental concern in the Xiamen case, the mass inci-
dent in Weng’an was triggered by a female student’s ‘unusual death’ that ignited 
the long-standing tensions between the local government and the people 
(Ding 2008; Zhang et al. 2008): before the unusual death happened, forced 
demolition and land grabbing by local government, lack of employment, and 
corrupt government practices had already resulted in a deep-rooted dissatis-
faction with local authority among residents (Zhao et al. 2008). After the death 
of the female student, local government asserted that the student had commit-
ted suicide by leaping into a river. However, her relatives refused to accept the 
verdict and claimed she had been raped, killed, and then tossed into the river 
by two male suspects, who were believed to have familial ties to the local pub-
lic security bureau. The student’s family went to petition the county’s party 
committee office, but the police refused their request for an examination of 
the corpse. Tension mounted and claims that the student’s relatives had been 
assaulted by the authorities instead of getting justice emerged and proliferated. 
3 For instance, Phoenix Weekly, a Hong Kong-sponsored news magazine trying to bring the 
potentially hazardous PX project into the public eye, was quickly pulled from shelves by 
the authorities in Xiamen.
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Some mobile messages read: ‘Without conducting a full autopsy, the police 
believed the female student committed suicide by jumping in a river, and they 
did not take mandatory measures against the suspect and ignored the family’s 
call for a full autopsy’ (Buckley 2008). Such messages ignited the public’s anger 
as the death became intertwined with corrupt government officials, merciless 
policemen, and perceived injustice across the small county. Mobile texts and 
calls had mobilized around 10,000 people who went to the public security 
bureau, smashed and burned all the police vehicles parked there, and set fire 
to government buildings (Yu 2008).
Although these two cases took place in different settings (urban vs. rural 
areas), involved different groups (i.e. the middle class in Xiamen vs. the rural 
residents in Weng’an), and were motivated by different reasons (environmen-
tal concern vs. justice-seeking), they both embraced the mobile phone as a 
crucial means of organizing and facilitating protests.
After case selection, this study adopted the method of snowball sampling to 
recruit research subjects, and then employed in-depth interviews to investi-
gate mobile phone uses for protest mobilization in the sample cases. Snowball 
sampling enables researchers to recruit individuals that are not easily accessi-
ble through other sampling strategies. Meanwhile, considering that mobile 
communication networks are an increasingly relevant interpersonal commu-
nication channel for social connections, they in practice lend themselves to 
the network-based logic of snowball sampling (e.g. Fortunati 2002; Ling 2008). 
Accordingly, this study locates participants in protests as interviewees by 
tracking the flow of mobilization messages within their mobile networks. The 
initial ‘seeds’ for sampling were by the author’s friends who work as journalists 
or editors in local media in the two locales. Twenty-eight participants were 
initially recruited. Next, due to the politically sensitive nature of protest par-
ticipation in China, the interviews were completely voluntary. Interviewees 
were also assured that the information collected would be securely stored and 
carefully analysed. The sample, however, has been reduced to 24 after remov-
ing those who withdrew from the research due to the sensitive subject matter. 
The remaining research subjects included 16 from the Xiamen case (male 9, 
female 7), with an average monthly salary of 5,500 RMB (900 USD), and eight 
from the Weng’an case (male 7, female 1), with an average monthly salary of 
2,500 RMB (408 USD).
This study used a semi-structured interview guide during focused conversa-
tions between the researcher and the interviewees to probe into the question 
of how participants employed their mobile phones to mobilize protests. 
Interviewees were asked to specify their mobile phone uses for mobilization 
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and elaborate on their responses to mobilization texts or calls and the mes-
sages’ impact on their perception and practices. Each interview was conducted 
in Chinese and lasted around one and a half hours. An explanation-building 
approach and cross-case synthesis (Yin 2009: 18) were employed after data col-
lection to figure out how participants used their mobile phones to organize 
protests against the authorities and what the influence of mobile communica-
tion on the mechanism of mobilization is.
5 Findings and Discussions
5.1 The Socialization Function of Mobile-Phone-Mediated Social Ties in 
Mobilization
At the beginning of the mobilization process, the socialization function of 
social ties cultivates an initial proposition on how political identity and con-
sciousness should be built towards a given protest issue. Passy especially 
underlines that it is through social interactions that such proposition has been 
established, shared, and recognized among people in a social network (2003: 
23). In this study, mobile communication plays a key role in facilitating social 
interactions that dramatically shape people’s perceptions and knowledge of 
politically sensitive and even censored issues in China despite government 
manipulation and censorship, get as many people close to the issues as possi-
ble, and engender their political consciousness for protests.
In practice, mobile interactions breached the authority-mandated informa-
tion blockade, in both cases offering alternative messages to shape people’s 
views and knowledge against the government’s dominant discourse. In the 
Xiamen case, it was through mobile interactions that local residents were 
informed that a petrochemical project with potentially detrimental influence 
on both the environment and public health had already been under construc-
tion, that some academics had tried to propose a relocation plan of the project 
but had been rejected,4 and that local government intended to keep people 
from knowing and discussing the project by censoring any PX-related informa-
tion. With the help of the mobile phone, the capacity to communicate with 
each other beyond face-to-face communication helped people share messages 
that were relevant to each other and carry out discussions through these mes-
sages regardless of censorship. In this way, social interactions facilitated by 
4 Zhao Yufen, a professor of chemistry and chemical engineering, rallied the opposition 
against the construction of the PX project. However, local government rejected her argument 
and forced her to keep silence.
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mobile phones fundamentally shaped people’s perceptions of the PX project 
and, more importantly, their attitudes towards local government. One inter-
viewee (Xiamen, 26 September 2010) noted that after receiving the warning 
text message she was disappointed that the local government ‘tried to hide 
such a relevant issue from people’.5 Another (Xiamen, 26 September 2010) 
recalled that, after talking with his friends via mobile phones regarding the PX 
project, he and his friends ‘felt rather angry with a government that sacrifices 
people’s well-being and even their lives to get benefits from such a “deleterious” 
project . . . They [the authorities] never care about our opinions!’ Against this 
backdrop, a high degree of public anger and frustration over the government’s 
perceived cheating practices and profit motives had been simmering, laying 
the foundations for later mobilization.
More importantly, as a form of interpersonal interaction on the basis of 
established social ties, mobile communication incorporates mutual trust and 
trustworthiness in social relations, and participants in these relations tend to 
attribute high credibility to such information. Meanwhile, the decline of social 
trust in China in recent years reinforces the role of social ties in everyday life, 
leading ‘one to trust only those individuals in one’s personal networks and to 
behave in accordance with a particularistic morality’ (Yan 2009: 286). 
Consequently, ‘to seek a new safety net, or to re-embed, the Chinese individual 
is forced to fall back to the family and personal network or guanxi’ (ibid.: 288, 
emphasis added). As this study observes, people are more likely to turn to mes-
sages from their mobile phones as the basis of their perceptions than to other 
information sources. For instance, the interviewees noted that they would 
trust those mobile messages arguing against the PX project from people within 
their social networks, even if ‘they do not have enough background or knowl-
edge about the topic [i.e. the PX project]’ (Xiamen, 26 September 2010). It is 
noteworthy that the high credibility of mobile messages due to relational trust 
from established social ties does not mean that people take for granted that 
the information is fact. To be sure, one of the popular mobile texts draws an 
analogy between the PX project and ‘an atomic bomb’, highlighting its disas-
trous consequences for people’s well-being and offspring. It is, however, impos-
sible for people with little chemical knowledge to judge the potential effect of 
the project on the local environment. Here, the trustworthiness from social 
ties greatly enhances the perceived credibility of the information and conse-
quently leads people to put aside the facts, or as one interviewee (Xiamen, 
5 The text read ‘. . . When this massive toxic chemical product goes into production, that will 
mean an atomic bomb has been released over all Xiamen island. The people of Xiamen will 
live with leukemia and deformed babies. We want to live and we want to be healthy!’
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27 September 2010) explained: ‘it’s better to believe it than not, especially when 
messages are coming from the people you trust.’ Consequently, although local 
government tried to advocate this project by insisting that it had already 
passed the assessment from national environmental agents, people still pre-
ferred to believe in the threats of ‘leukemia’ and ‘deformed babies’, both of 
which have indeed been directly connected to PX-related environmental pol-
lution in the long run, but which in this case are relayed through the perceived 
reliable source of social ties. Such descriptions firmly made the interviewees 
believe that the PX project would ‘ruin’ the living conditions in Xiamen and 
destroy their well-being and that of their offspring.
Similarly, in the Weng’an case, mobile communication facilitated contested 
narratives about homicide suspicions regarding the female student’s ‘unusual 
death’ against local authorities’ claims that the girl had committed suicide. 
Coming from the highly-trusted information source of established social ties, 
such narratives convinced people that the government was trying to cover up 
certain unmentionable scandals, deepening the distrust between government 
and local residents. Such perceptions thus sparked widespread fury at the per-
ceived corruption and tyranny of the authorities and prepared people for pro-
test as an action against the authorities.
Furthermore, the ubiquity of mobile phones and the proliferation of mobile 
messages enable as many people as possible to recognize that an issue is rele-
vant to them, engendering a broad social foundation for mobilization. In the 
Xiamen case, by virtue of their mobile phones, residents assured that PX-related 
messages quickly proliferated that would have otherwise been blocked by local 
authorities. In Xiamen, a city of 1.5 million people, the messages had reportedly 
been repeated more than 1 million times until they had reached practically 
every citizen there (Lan & Zhang 2007). This feature maximizes the reach of 
information and broadens its influence. The extensive influence mobile com-
munication generated has largely paved the way for the success of the protests. 
During the demonstration, most of the police and soldiers were simply sur-
rounding people while indirectly giving them their support rather than block-
ing the protests. Some of the police were even telling people during the march 
to make a racket if they liked. As one local civil servant (Xiamen, 28 September 
2010) admitted, ‘every person already knew very well via mobile message alerts 
that they and their children would suffer if the PX project went ahead.’
To sum up, mobile phones play a key role in ensuring social interactions, 
despite government censorship, among people who share and discuss infor-
mation that they feel is relevant to them. The process of sharing and dissemi-
nating messages via mobile phones entails not just information distribution as 
such, but also generates interpretive frames by shaping individuals’  perceptions 
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and knowledge about certain issues. Mobile communication thus distributes 
messages with high credibility through established social ties, encouraging 
people to trust such messages and disseminate them further, thereby continu-
ously extending the scope of this process. The socialization function of social 
ties, mediated by mobile phones in this study, facilitates alternative narratives 
against the dominant discourse of the authorities, galvanizing widespread dis-
trust and anger over official corruption, irresponsibility, inaction, and suppres-
sion of citizens. Such function furthermore accumulates feelings of oppression 
or injustice that evoke a collective identity and generates people’s political 
consciousness for protest. In this process, given the trustworthiness from social 
ties, mobile communication creates ‘relational credibility’ for mobilization, as 
it reformulates a cultural model of meaning in which ultimate meaning is 
defined less by the content itself than by the credibility embedded in the social 
ties between communicators.6
5.2 The Structural-Connection Function of Mobile-Phone-Mediated 
Social Ties in Mobilization
The structural-connection function describes the role that social ties play in 
providing opportunities for the establishment of connections between indi-
viduals and movement, and for the realization of mobilization in action. Passy 
recognizes that social ties are more relevant to mobilization in repressive 
regimes than in liberal democracies. However, her study remains largely 
focused on social ties within social movement organizations in liberal contexts 
(2003: 33-35). What, then, is the situation in repressive regimes? More specifi-
cally, do social ties, mediated by mobile phones, have a similar structural- 
connection function in China, where mobilization takes place without the 
involvement of movement organizations?
As this study observes, mobile communication offers unprecedented 
opportunities for connecting individuals to movements in China. On the one 
hand, the affordances mobile technologies provide empower ordinary users, 
even those without sufficient technical competencies to, for example, use the 
Internet, to mobilize people within their social networks for contentious activ-
ities in an easy but effective way. On the other hand, given the embedment of 
social ties in mobile communication, such communication involves reliability 
of personal relations and social support, including trust, solidarity, and loyalty, 
6 It could be argued that this process of information perception and private accreditation is 
similar to Benkler’s argument that digital media facilitate a ‘see-for-yourself ’ culture (2006: 
218-219).
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all of which guarantee the safety of distributing mobilization messages in a 
repressive context such as China.
In practice, mobile technologies provide a convenient and highly effective 
way for people to initiate contentious activities or mount collective resistance 
to the authorities through a simple and fast method – twiddling their thumbs 
over a mobile phone keyboard. According to the interviewees, the two follow-
ing characteristics of mobile communication  – inexpensiveness and immedi-
acy – facilitate mobilization and empower users to participate in contentious 
activities. Inexpensiveness involves both the low-cost, easy-to-use mobile 
phone as the key mobilizing means and the cheap telecommunication price 
for information dissemination for protest mobilization, be it through voice call 
or text messaging. The ubiquity of mobile phones and the low-priced telecom-
munication fee have made this device one of the most widely used communi-
cation technologies in today’s everyday life (Ling 2013). The capability of 
lowering the threshold for organizing and coordinating protests is accordingly 
immense, as mobile phones – cheaper to own and easier to run than comput-
ers – gain ground as tools for facilitating collective action and other forms of 
contentious politics. Meanwhile, immediacy refers to the instantaneous infor-
mation transfer service via mobile phones, in particular the synchronous voice 
call, which enables rapid mobilization for protests. Mobile communication 
technologies allow for the establishment of ‘perpetual contact’ (Katz & Aakhus 
2002) through which each mobile user is personally addressable anytime any-
where (Ling 2008: 3). In this way, the diffusion of mobilization messages takes 
place instantaneously. Immediate communication means that mobilization 
calls proliferate within a short period, making it difficult for the authorities to 
predict outbursts of public dissatisfaction or intervene in potential protests. In 
the Xiamen case, for instance, a civil servant (Xiamen, 24 September 2010) 
admitted that local government never realized the mobilization text for anti-
PX protests would go viral merely via mobile phones and reach ‘millions of 
residents’ (Lan & Zhang 2007) within three days, finally resulting in offline pro-
tests. Immediacy thus generates the potential for rapid mobilization, which 
may leave the authorities unprepared for protests. In short, mobile phones 
enable individuals to connect and mobilize in a low cost but rapid way, further 
attaching a degree of unpredictability to mobilization, which to an extent 
guarantees that protests unfold without intervention from the authorities.
More importantly, given the trust in and reliability of social ties, mobile 
communication provides participants with secure and reliable means to 
engage in recruitment and mobilization for protests. According to Passy, trust 
is a crucial driving factor behind mobilization in particular in ‘situations of 
uncertainty’ (2003: 34). In authoritarian regimes like China, both legal and 
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extralegal means have become common methods for the authorities to exert 
harsh controls, suppress collective actions, and stifle potential mobilizations. 
Due to the exponentially increasing popularity of new digital media, including 
mobile phones and social media, the authorities are working even harder to 
tighten their control over digital platforms in order to curtail the possibilities 
of collection actions (e.g. King et al. 2013). Against this backdrop, trust from 
social ties has a decisive impact on the practice of distributing mobilization 
messages, as it guarantees that such ‘forbidden contents’ can be disseminated 
safely, even against opposition from the Chinese authorities. As one inter-
viewee (Xiamen, 29 September 2010) elaborated,
 . . . you have to think over to whom you would like to send such kind of 
information [for protest recruitment]. In particular, you have to take into 
consideration your mutual relationship, including the trust and reliability 
of the other side . . . You have to be sure that the receiver is reliable and 
the authorities will not be able to detect protest mobilization by being 
informed by the receivers in advance.
Here, mobile phones provide people with a highly secure means to identify the 
receiver of mobilization messages and to recruit them, as mobile communica-
tion is largely carried out on the basis of established social ties.7 In the process 
of recruitment, more specifically, the senders starts by looking for receivers in 
their personal networks, through their mobile phone directories, who they 
believe will respond to their appeal for protest. The higher the level of mutual 
trust and reliability that the recruiter attributes to the relationship, the greater 
their belief that their contact will participate in the protests, and the more 
likely it becomes that they will notify that person. Similarly, the higher the 
degree of mutual trust that the senders perceive, the more secure they will 
believe the protest organization to be, and the more likely it consequently 
becomes that they will deliver mobilization messages to that specific person. 
In contrast, to spread mobilization messages through the Internet for recruit-
7 It is necessary to note that, working together with its state-owned mobile operators (i.e. 
China Mobile, China Unicom, and China Telecom), the Chinese government has set up con-
tent-filtering systems, based on keywords and combinations of keywords, to block and track 
‘political sensitive words’ in mobile networks. Nevertheless, people in practice are turning to 
the power of rhetoric, including ‘innuendo and metaphor, parody and hyperbole’, ‘sarcasm 
and scorn through veiled gibes and wily indirection’ (Yu 2011), to help them break through 
government keyword blocking and censorship filters. For instance, in the Xiamen case the 
terms ‘sanbu’ (stroll) and ‘gouwu’ (shopping) were employed as alternatives to ‘demonstra-
tion’ and ‘protest’.
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ment is ‘a rather dangerous choice’, as the diffusion process is ‘totally out of 
control’ (personal communication with interviewee, 26 September 2010). One 
interviewee (Xiamen, 26 September 2010) explained:
Although it [posting mobilization messages online] definitely means 
that your message is read by as many people as possible, you will 
also have to take the risk of being identified by government censors or 
surveillance agencies for disseminating politically sensitive information. 
The Internet is under stern surveillance and intense monitoring from the 
government.
Distributing mobilization messages through mobile phones instead represents 
a more reliable way to carry out recruitment and mobilization. The senders 
know exactly to whom they deliver mobilization messages. The receivers simi-
larly recognize from whom the call for mobilization comes. Therefore, select-
ing receivers for mobilization messages is neither a random process nor a 
simple inclusion of all the names in a person’s mobile phone directory. Instead, 
the consideration regarding social ties and, more precisely, the trust and reli-
ability between sender and receiver ranks above all else. As one interviewee 
(Weng’an, 13 October 2010) summarizes, ‘sending [mobilization] messages in a 
correct way is the very first step for successful protest . . . No one will know 
what you are talking about except you and the person on the other side of the 
phone.’
In short, the lower costs and access to easy-to-use mobilization tools make 
it easier for ordinary people, even those without complex digital skills, to initi-
ate and coordinate protest movement. The immediacy lays a foundation for 
rapid diffusion of mobilization message, which amplifies the scale of influence 
of mobilization. Apart from the technological advantages, using mobile phones 
for mobilization is a secure and reliable process through which people connect 
to, recruit, and mobilize others within their social networks for protests, as it is 
a low profile way to initiate and coordinate protests in repressive regimes such 
as China. Here, mobile communication incorporates ‘relational reliability’, or 
trust and reliability from social ties between communicators, for recruitment 
and mobilization.
5.3 The Decision-Shaping Function of Mobile-Phone-Mediated Social 
Ties in Mobilization
In the final stage of mobilization, the decision-shaping function of social ties 
plays a critical role in driving potential participants to real-world protest. In 
other words, this function encourages or even ‘pushes’ people to move from 
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intent to action. This study observes that, through its embedded social ties, 
mobile communication generates mutual reliability and reciprocal obligation, 
which entail pressure to participate in protests not just as a sort of social sup-
port but also to fulfil the duties that are attached to people’s mutual 
relationships.
Mutual reliability refers to the perception that an individual can both appeal 
to and draw strength from his or her social ties, while reciprocal obligation 
addresses the dynamics through which the mutual reliability of individuals is 
realized, reassured, and reproduced (Gouldner 1960). The formation of social 
ties establishes a sense of mutual reliability, through which individuals gauge 
the support available to them from social ties and the degree to which they are 
integrated into a social network. The reciprocal obligation contributes to the 
maintenance and development of social ties, as it implies that ‘each party has 
rights and duties’ (Goulder 1960: 169, emphasis in the original) to support oth-
ers in their social network. People who fail to fulfil their reciprocal obligations 
will instead suffer from certain social penalties (e.g. the social network 
resources at their disposal will be jeopardized). The feeling of obligation to 
respond to the request from people within one’s social network, be it through 
face-to-face or mobile communication, maintains the reciprocal dependency 
of social ties and further contributes to cohesion in social life.
With the embedment of social ties in mobile communication, using mobile 
phones for mobilization involves a strong sense of mutual reliability and recip-
rocal obligation, pushing people to participate in protests to fulfil the duties 
and obligations that arise from their social ties. According to the interviews, 
when people received mobilization messages via their mobile phones, the 
messages reminded them on the one hand of their relationship with the send-
ers, and on the one hand of their duties in the social network. Such feeling, 
generated by self-perceived duties and responsibilities given the basis of the 
reciprocal nature of social ties, encourages people to respond positively to 
requests as at once a sort of social support and as a way to fulfil their duties in 
the social relationship. In other words, as soon as people received mobilization 
messages, the first and foremost thing they recognize is not the mobilization 
initiative. Instead, it is the relevance of social ties and their duties in social rela-
tionships. As one interviewee (Xiamen, 26 September 2010) noted, 
 . . . the [mobilization] message is, more relevant, an appeal from your 
social network. In other words, the people you know or have a close rela-
tionship with are seeking your response, help, and support. How could 
you thrust aside this kind of appeal?
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This statement shows that the reciprocal obligation greatly shapes people’s 
response to such appeals, encouraging people to engage in protest as a way to 
fulfil their duties in the social relationship.
In contrast, those who declined to respond to mobilization messages or 
rejected participation were considered to have failed in their duties to others 
within their social networks. The refusal to participate is no longer the focus of 
the issue here. Instead, the refusal implies ‘a refusal to fulfil your duty and obli-
gation in a social relation’ (personal communication with interviewee, 21 
September 2010), consequently eroding one’s social ties in the long run. One 
interviewee (Weng’an, 26 October 2010) asked: ‘If you do not react to requests 
from your friends, then how can you expect their help in the future?’ With this 
in mind, people not only became engaged themselves but also recruited peo-
ple within their social networks for the protests.
Furthermore, the more times people received mobilization messages from 
their social networks, the more ‘pressure’ they perceive to participate in the 
protests, and consequently the more willing they became to join. As one inter-
viewee (Xiamen, 26 September 2010) elaborated, ‘the multiple [mobilization] 
messages illustrate that the people you know all agree on this issue [to go on 
strikes or demonstrate]. And they are urging you to be one of them. You clearly 
do not want to be isolated.’ As such, the fear of being isolated also plays into 
mobilization dynamics, making people more willing to engage in protests. 
Besides that, as one interviewee (Xiamen, 21 September 2010) notes, ‘knowing 
that quite a lot of people you know have engaged in the protest [against the PX 
project] as I received messages [via my mobile phone] from them really 
strengthens the feeling of togetherness against what the government has done.’ 
Instead of being scattered individuals, participants realize that they are in fact 
‘networked individuals’ (Rainie & Wellman 2012) enjoying support and solidar-
ity from their social network. The consequent feeling of empowerment pushes 
more and more people to participate in the protests. 
In summary, in the mobile-phone-mediated mobilization process, the 
decision-shaping function of social ties is largely based on relational obliga-
tion. In other words, the embedment of social ties in mobile communication, 
and in particular the reciprocity resulting from this, has been a pivotal facilita-
tor for mobilization of and participation in protests. During the process of 
mobile interactions, the reciprocal nature of social ties engenders mutual reli-
ability and evokes obligations on both sides, which accordingly facilitates col-
lective action mobilization and participation. The degree of reliability further 
strengthens the feeling of reciprocity in protests, while the practice of reci-
procity (i.e. joining the protests) secures and further intensifies mutual reli-
ability and the feeling of solidarity during the protests. 
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6 Conclusion
Mobile phones have been increasingly employed as means of mobilization for 
protests, in China as much as in other parts of the world. Nevertheless, the 
question of how mobile phone uses shape and contribute to the mechanism of 
mobilization is largely unspecified and under-theorized. By investigating two 
cases involving mobile phones as a requisite means for protest mobilization 
through 24 in-depth interviews, this study sheds light on the role of the mobile 
phone as a means of mobilizing protests. In particular, the article has exam-
ined the following two aspects: On the one hand, mobile communication tech-
nologies provide favourable affordances, such as immediate connection and 
rapid diffusion of mobilization messages, for protest mobilization. On the 
other hand, and more importantly, mobile communication embodies and reg-
isters the relational dynamics of social ties, which shapes participants’ percep-
tions of given protest issues, ensures the safety of protest mobilization in a 
repressive context, and generates pressure to participate, all of which contrib-
utes to the mechanism of mobilization. To better draw out the contribution 
of mobile phones to mobilization, this study thus suggests that the concept of 
‘relational mobilization’ helps address how social ties are embedded in mobile 
communication, and how this influences the mechanism of mobilization. This 
concept highlights the following three issues.
First, mobile phones enable and facilitate alternative communication 
beyond traditional communication channels. As the trustworthiness from 
social ties becomes embedded in mobile communication, such communica-
tion becomes characterized by relational credibility, which means that those 
engaged in mobile communication attribute high credibility to information 
they receive via their mobile phones. In turn, such information with high cred-
ibility dramatically shapes people’s perception towards a given protest event.
Second, mobile phones enable people to mobilize and accumulate their 
social resources for protests in unprecedented ways that are both low profile 
and incredibly easy – twiddling thumbs over a mobile phone’s keyboard. The 
trust and reliability from social ties guarantee that ‘politically sensitive’ mobi-
lization messages are safely distributed in repressive regimes like China. Such 
guarantee, on the basis of relational reliability, to a degree allows recruitment 
and mobilization to be carried out without the authorities’ intervention.
Third, using mobile phones for mobilization involves mutual reliability and 
reciprocal obligation from social ties, which encourage receivers to respond 
to the mobilization appeal out of a sense of a duty to their social networks. 
As such, mobile communication embodies relational obligation that generates 
pressure to participate, driving people to engage in protest.
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By addressing the relevance of social ties in mobilization, this study also has 
implications for future research on mobile phone uses and collective actions 
in Asian countries, as there are similarities in social ties and relationships 
among different countries in Asia. In South Korea, for instance, the words 
‘In-maek’ or ‘Yeon-jul’ imply an enduring, dyadic close personal connection 
that provides emotional support while applying strong pressure on network 
members to conform (Yazawa 2006: 315). In Japan, the idea of ‘Aidagara’, 
roughly translated as interdependence, connotes mutual dependence and 
mutual trust between social actors (ibid.: 314). A promising question that 
scholars should explore as they further theorize the role of mobile phones in 
mobilization would be to what extent the current understanding of mobile 
phones as facilitators of relational mobilization can be employed to under-
stand protests in other Asian contexts.
To sum up, this study contributes to the understanding of new communica-
tion technologies and their role in political protests in three ways: First, it high-
lights how the relational dynamics of social ties are embedded in mobile 
communication, and what function these social ties have as a driving force to 
mobilize participants for collective action. Second, as this study argues, beyond 
its instrumental function, mobile communication establishes a cultural 
dimension of social interaction that shapes the production of meanings and 
the articulation of perceptions and preferences regarding given protest issues. 
This dimension plays a significant role in the process of recruitment and mobi-
lization in the absence of SMOs in authoritarian regimes like China. Third, as 
this study demonstrates, the understanding of the emancipatory potential of 
digital technologies and its actualization requires a synthetic approach that 
focuses attention on how technology and social/cultural dynamics are inter-
twined. Research on social media, including Facebook and Twitter, and politi-
cal mobilization has also stressed, for instance, that the personalized influence 
of (political) content has a significant impact on collective action mobilization 
(e.g. Bennett 2012; Bennett & Segerberg 2012).8 Only by examining the  relational 
8 This study acknowledges the emerging role of social media in collective mobilization around 
the world, as many studies have already documented (e.g. during the Arab Spring). 
Nevertheless, in the context of China the political role of social media in facilitating protests 
and contentions is still quite limited due to the Chinese governments’ increasingly intensify-
ing online censorship. More specifically, on the one hand, social media sites such as Facebook 
and Twitter have been blocked in mainland China since 2009, following fierce riots that had 
erupted in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region, and that the authorities asserted were 
abetted by these social networking sites. On the other hand, the government constantly 
strives to exert its control over domestic social media websites like Weibo, the Chinese equiv-
alent of Twitter. For instance, during the latest crackdown on Weibo under the guise of ‘elimi-
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dynamics of such processes can we produce a more accurate understanding of 
the complex interplay between human and technological agency.
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